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RULE-BASED FISCAL CONSOLIDATION PACTS IN INDIA AND
EUROPEAN UNION: A RELOOK INTO THE PROCESSES
Subrata Dutta and Auke R. Leen 
The emerging economies including India have shown symptoms of quicker recovery from the
world-wide recession than the economies in the global north. The financial sector in euro-zone is
still in deep trouble. High deficit countries, for example, Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain, among
some others, are being blamed for the trouble. If solutions are not found to rescue the troubled zone,
the developing countries may be further adversely affected. India’s goods export to Europe has
already moderated. Although Europe is no longer India’s biggest export destination, the economy
may be indirectly hit via other trading partners. Structural fiscal imbalances in the European
countries are currently being tackled with common strict rules under the European "Fiscal Compact"
which is the new version of the Stability and Growth Pact. Until mid-last decade, both the Indian
centralgovernment and the state governmentswere found to be trapped into similarchronic problems.
To address such structural issues, in India, the central and state governments have enacted the Fiscal
Responsibility and Budget Management Acts in the national parliament and state assemblies,
respectively. This paper looks into the fiscal consolidation processes in India and the EU and seeks
to derive some understandings from the political economy perspectives of the processes.
1. Introduction
At the present juncture in euro-zone, many
scholars think that Eurobonds or European
Banking Deposit Guarantee (some other ideas are
also floating) may quickly rescue the European
Union (EU) from the present crisis and further
troubles. While it is true that Eurobonds as a
cosmetic solution may be a quick remedy for the
EU, it seems extremely difficult that such quick
measures would be able to find sustainable
solutions to the problems that have stemmed from
the underlying structural fiscal imbalances and
the consequent debt burdens of some member
countries. Until mid-last decade, both the Indian
central government and the state governments
were found to be trapped into the similar chronic
problems. To address such structural issues, the
central and state governments have enacted the
Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management
(FRBM) Act in the national parliament and state
assemblies, respectively. This paper looks into
the fiscal consolidation processes in India and EU
and seeks to derive some understandings from
their political economy perspectives.1
Following the recommendations of the
Twelfth Finance Commission (TFC), most of the
states in India undertook a set of fiscal consoli-
dation strategies through the enactment of the
FRBM Bill (after the union government enacted
it in 2003) which have not only helped them to
come out of the structural deficit crisis but also
saved them from further trouble -- which could
have been much worse than what it has actually
been -- amidst global slowdown. In 2003-04 (i.e.,
just prior to the FRBM era), only Jharkhand had
been found to be the revenue surplus state among
the non-special category states (special category
states are located in hilly terrain and depend
heavily on transfers from the Centre; we discuss
this later again in this article). Most of the states
enacted the FRBM in and around 2005. By
2007-08, a large number of states were found as
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revenue surplus states. They include Bihar,
Chhattisgarh, Goa, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka,
Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Rajas-
than, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and Andhra
Pradesh [Dutta, 2012a, Pp. 1-41]. After 2007-08,
however, states’ fiscal situation deteriorated due
to global economic slowdown.
Enactments of the FRBM by the states of India
were possible largely due to its strong federal
construction, with the union government playing
the dominant role. On the other hand, although
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in the EU
has a long history of about 20 years, the EU has
failed, at least for the last 10 years, to come up
with an impressively successful use of the SGP
to get out of its present crisis. At the moment, the
EU as a central system is in an existential crisis
which has been one main reason for why a new
treaty, i.e., Fiscal Compact, has replaced SGP and
thereby came into effect on 1 January 2013 for
the 16 countries which completed ratification
prior to this date. There are some fundamental
differencesbetween the Indian federal system and
the EU federal system. The EU has a basic "birth
defect" in the sense that while it is a monetary
union, it is not a fiscal union. India is both a fiscal
and monetary Union and the central government
has a much more effective mechanism to super-
vise and monitor the member states. EU is not a
fiscal union and there has been no mechanism to
effectively supervise, monitor and review the
working of the SGP or the Maastricht Treaty. In
India, according to the Article 293 of the Con-
stitution, states are not allowed to borrow from
outside the country and even their borrowing is
domestically restricted (for example, a consent
from the central government is mandatory) if they
are indebted to the Union government or if they
have any outstanding loans in respect of which a
guarantee has been given by the Union govern-
ment.
Following the recommendations of the TFC,
the central government disintermediated from the
borrowings of state governments from 2005-06
onwards. Loans from the National Small Savings
Fund (NSSF) -- granted by the centre to the states
-- have also declined substantially after 2006-07.
As a result, state governments have increasingly
gone for market borrowings in the form of State
Development Loans (SDL) from 2007-08
onwards [Ghosh et al., 2012]. In future, somestate
governments may be able to run their economic
affairs without being indebted -- directly or
indirectly (e.g., in the form of guarantees) -- to
the central government. In that case, there should
not be any problem, in principle, for the states to
borrow without the consent of the central gov-
ernment. However, according to the Article 293,
the states are allowed to borrow within the limits
as fixed by the Legislatures of the states con-
cerned. Currently, such restriction is imposed by
theFRBM Acts. Before FRBM, the states showed
symptoms of chronic revenue deficit problem
(which further contributed to the fiscal deficit
problem) and high debt accumulation (which in
turn kept raising debt-servicing costs). We dis-
cuss the contextual issues related to FRBM later
at length in this article. But, whether a state should
be allowed to borrow (without the central gov-
ernment as a guarantor) from outside the country
is a matter for furtherdebate. Many foreignparties
may not sign a contract with a state government
since a state is not a sovereign body. If the
contracting party outside India does not have any
problem in this respect, then it may not be
imperative for the Indian law to stand as an
obstacle andnecessary provisions shouldbe made
at the constitutional level. But, whether external
borrowing would bring in any additional benefit
and what might be the risks to the Indian feder-
ation on account of the quantum and quality of its
total external debt are matters which require a
very serious examination and are not addressed
here.
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Indian central government is a sovereign and
powerful entity compared to its sub-national
governments, whereas the EU central body is a
much weak entity compared to its sovereign
member states. Indian central government is fis-
cally more powerful than its states, while, in the
EU, the real fiscal powers lie in the hands of the
member states. So, the two cases are not, in true
sense, comparable, and thus we do not propose to
undertake a comparative study through this essay;
rather we seek to look into the two processes for
our better understanding. However, in the light of
the present discussion, the question that arises
here is: whether the EU needs a tighter fiscal
federal system, with stronger European Com-
mission (EC) as a central body which will have
greater power, than it currently does have -- in
order to streamline the messy fiscal situations and
thus to restore, by learning by doing, the very
existence of the EU. The current sovereign debt
crisis in the euro-zone emphasises that a common
monetary policy needs a common fiscal policy as
well. For this reason, the EU has repeatedly been
engaged in reform debates to reformulate the
SGP. What are the central elements that need to
be contained in a new fiscal pact? In this paper,
we will look into the political economy per-
spectives as well as main features of the Indian
FRBM Act as adopted in its federal system. The
political economy perspectives of the reforms of
the EU’s SGP will also be looked into. Keeping
in view the fundamental differences between the
institutional relationship of the EU with its largely
sovereign member states, on the one hand, and
the federal relationship of the Indian sovereign
central government with its own states, on the
other, we broadly intend to study the two different
systems with particular reference to the European
"Fiscal Compact" (or the reform process of the
SGP) and the FRBM and seek to understand the
strengths and weaknesses of the two processes.
Under the great market pressure, the EU is in
search of a solution to its current sovereign debt
crisis. Along with finding solutions to the urgent,
short-term challenges, the EU, as it is realised, is
in need of maintaining long-term, compact dis-
ciplineas well as coordination in its fiscal domain.
Since trust also works backward, a genuine
fiscally stable union, which is built on long-term
foundation, it is expected, will add to the trust in
resolving short-term problems as well. Thus,
short- and long-term problem-solving mecha-
nisms are to go hand-in-hand. The EU member
countries realise that they need to enhance the
scopes for achieving higher competitiveness (for
attaining higher growth) through greater social
cohesion and a deeper integration in the internal
market [European Commission, 2011; European
Council, 2011]. In this connection, the Com-
mission has recently laid down its proposals in its
publication titled "Single Market Act II: Together
for New Growth" and emphasised four drivers for
new growth. The drivers which are expected to
facilitate new growth in the EU through higher
competitiveness of the member countries are (1)
developingfully integrated networks in theSingle
Market; (2) fostering mobility of citizens and
businesses across borders; (3) supporting the
digital economy across Europe; and (4)
strengthening social entrepreneurship, cohesion
and consumer confidence.2 Moreover, it is
imperative to take forward stringent rule-based
governance with a view to ensuring clear disci-
plines in the fiscal domain as some countries in
the EU have recently gone messy in relation to
their fiscal matters and severely interrupted eco-
nomic growth of the whole region. We are going
to elaborate this in further detail in the following
sections. We choose to delve into the issues
related to fiscal rules because fiscal domain is
considered, by many scholars [see, among others,
Cooper, 2011], to be the source of generation of
vicious recessionary waves in the present time.
The present situation requires the euro area to
have a new deal between its member states and
reinforce the same in the form of a new legal
framework. Since the principles of the new Fiscal
Compact are in the process of being ratified by
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the EU member states by 2013,3 it might be useful
to look into the fiscal consolidation processes in
both India and EU in the light of the natures of
their fiscal federalism and see as to what goes in
the positive or negative direction in the EU and
in India (e.g., India translated necessary fiscal
rules into legislation, i.e., FRBM Act)4, and under
what conditions (e.g., whether or not strong
federal structure of India has facilitated its states
to have unitary fiscal policies or, more specifi-
cally, to follow uniform fiscal rules. In this
perspective, this study assumes special
significance at the present juncture.
2. From the (Previous) SGP to the (Current)
Fiscal Compact: Background, Contents and
Problems
While discussing SGP, a brief contextualisa-
tionneeds to be provided. TheEU has grown from
six member states in 1957 (at the time of the
Treaty of Rome) to its present 27 member states
(Croatia is set to become the 28th member in
2013). It has about half a billion inhabitants and,
at present, a gross national income (GNI) of over
13 trillion euro (17 trillion U.S. dollars). Pres-
ently, 17 member states belong to the euro single
currency system. In the euro-zone, a
supranational monetary policy is interacting with
decentralised fiscal authorities [Leen, 2011, Pp.
203-205]. Since the 2008 sovereign debt crisis in
the EU, this region has been experiencing tough
time in relation to controlling ever-increasing
budget deficits of especially the Southern Euro-
pean countries. This has instigated the EU to
reform SGP and incorporate certain clauses into
it in order to force the EU member states to
maintain their borrowing under control in order
to create stable conditions in the EU.
The SGP consisted of a set of rules that aimed
at maintaining fiscal discipline in the EU member
states. They are described in Articles 121 and 126
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU) and Protocol 12 attached to the
TFEU and the Consolidated Version of the Treaty
on European Union [European Union, 2008]. The
rules consist of preventive and dissuasive arms.
Under the provisions of the preventive arm, the
member states must submit annual stability or
convergence programmes. In response, the Union
can issue an early warning to prevent the occur-
rence of excessive deficit and can directly offer
policy recommendations to a member state. The
dissuasive arm governs the excessive deficit
related matters. The budget deficit cannot exceed
3 per cent of GDP. The exemption is allowed if
the excess is relatively small, temporary and
exceptional. Also, for short-term exemption, the
overall trends of the deficit should be regarded as
continuously as well as substantially declining.
Generally, the government debt cannot exceed 60
per cent of GDP.5
Since the time horizon set by the policymak-
ers/politicians (of the ruling party/coalition) is
generally short as they are in need of
implementing their manifesto and other promises
within themandated timeframe, they may be often
seen to be inclined to deviate from what is
regarded as optimal fiscal policy . In short, an
optimal fiscal policy refers to a policy of choosing
taxes and expenditures to maximise social wel-
fare. In order to maximise welfare in a short span
of time, the government (the ruling
party/coalition) may prefer to increase the level
of expenditures which may not be in conformity
with tax policy. Thus, government budgets may
suffer from deficit bias caused by overspending
attached to fulfilment of political ambitions of the
politicians. In the Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU), fiscal slippage in one of the member
states probably has adverse effects on interest
rates throughout the union. So, it is even possible
that other governments will want to support the
offender explicitly or implicitly by undertaking
financial transfers or by purchasing the offending
government’s debt titles [Langenus, 2005, Pp.
65-81]. Despite the presence of an explicit no-
bailout clause (Article 125 of the Consolidated
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Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2008),
bailouts are now happening in the EU through a
country’s temporary emergency fund. For
example, for Ireland and Portugal, an amount of
48.5 billion euro is to be disbursed over three
years period, i.e., 2011-13. And the European
Central Bank (ECB), the only goal of which is to
maintain price stability, is, as argued by Buiter
[2010, Pp. 12-19], also involved in buying bonds
of troubled governments to fulfil the fiscal needs
of the latter. In February 2013, the ECB stated
that the Italian Government bonds accounted for
nearly half of its total holding (the ECB holds
bonds of face value of 218 billion euro or 292
billion US dollar). It holds bonds of 44.3 billion
euro and 33.9 billion euro for Spain and Greece,
respectively.
How did the SGP come about? The rules set
in theMaastricht Treaty [1992] in order to achieve
the EMU are also seen to be applicable in the euro
currency regime that was initiated in 1999. After
the euro was launched, fiscal discipline evapo-
rated. Many countries, however, faced difficulty
in meeting the SGP rules. In 2003, the two largest
economies in the euro-zone -- Germany and
France -- broke the rules. They, however, prom-
ised to reach the SGP targets as soon as possible.
Therefore, no action was taken against them. In
general, however, if a country breaks the rules, it
has to take harsh measures to reduce its deficit. If
it breaks the rules for three consecutive years, an
imposition of fine up to 0.5 per cent of GDP may
be proposed and institutionalised.
Because the SGP looked weak, the Council of
the EU temporarily suspended it.6 In 2005, the EU
agreed on a reformed SGP with much more
flexible rules [Gonzalez-Paramo, 2005]. On the
surface level, the key rules pertaining to deficits
and debt were maintained, but the reformed pact
contained a list of exceptions for certain types of
spending that would not be counted as part of the
debt, e.g., spending on education, research and
defence (a political fiscal gimmickry in book-
keeping). Therefore, it was almost impossible to
break the rules. However, even these much
simplified rules were challenged when France, in
2007, tried to revitalise the French economy with
Keynesian policies.7 Of the member states with
great budget deficits and accumulated debts,
particularly the situation of Greece is critical as
it deliberately provided the EC, the executive arm
of the Union, with wrong information about its
deficit and debt figures.
In 2008, partly because of the global economic
crisis, average public debt in the euro-zone began
to rise, especially in Ireland, Spain, France, and
Greece [Hentschelmann, 2010]. In 2010, to res-
cue some member states, two temporary emer-
gency funds -- the European Financial Stability
Facility (EFSF) and the European Financial
Stability Mechanism (EFSM) -- with a combined
budget of 500 billion euro have been established.
Member states can draw low-interest loans from
the funds. In May 2010, Greece took the first loan.
In late 2010, Ireland got a bailout too and in 2011
Portugal and again Greece got loans. In 2013,
Cyprus has got a loan of 10 billion euro. In
October 2012, the permanent European Stability
Mechanism (ESM) has entered into force with a
budget of 700 billion euros. In the new Fiscal
Compact, it is stated that countries cannot get
bailouts unless they sign and apply the pact.
Both the versions of the fiscal rules -- the SGP
and the new Fiscal Compact -- have received
critical reactions from different quarters. The
SGP washeavily criticised by the German Central
Bank and German Government [Stark, 2001, Pp.
77-105], while the reformed version has been
criticised by, inter alia, Schuknech, et al. [2011].
While the old SGP has been marked as too rigid,
the new version is blamed to be containing so
many provisions of exemptions that a country, as
often argued and just stated, would find it hard to
breach the regulations. Moreover, there have been
no effective rules to prevent a breach of the SGP
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and punish a member state for doing it. Hence,
there has been lengthy discussion in the EU to
establish a new fiscal pact. Several draft fiscal
pacts were proposed and the final version was
approved on 2 March 2012.8
A major change introduced in the new Fiscal
Compact is that the member states are not forced
to meet the targets every year; the budget has to
be balancedover an economic cycle. The new rule
entails, compared to the previous SGP, that the
cyclically adjusted budget deficit is to be no more
than 0.5 per cent of GDP and a government must
run fiscal surplus until its debt level has fallen
down to 60 per cent of GDP. As said, a budget
needs, in principle, to be in balance. This is a more
stringent rule than the previous one which had
allowed budget deficit of maximum limit of 3 per
cent of GDP. Thus, against the backdrop of much
relaxed formulation, the new Fiscal Compact is
trying to implement tight policy that is expected
to result in greater effectiveness. Also, as has been
done in India, the new fiscal rules need to be
introduced in the member states’ national legal
systems at constitutional or equivalent level. We
come to this discussion later.
Another change required is that the EU should
adopt more stringent principles to effectively
penalise the states with excessive deficits or for
violating the rules as set in this particular respect.
Currently, the Commission has upgraded the
theoretical sanctions to real automatic sanctions.
TheCommission, even without a referral from the
Council, would then directly impose sanctions in
the event of excessive deficits. Since there is a
need for direct intervention in the budgets of
member states (as we have experienced SGP
violations earlier), there should be a defined
mechanism that would assess the degree of vio-
lation and ascertain the intervention process. In
this respect, as suggestions came from the EC, the
post of a European "Stabilisation Commissioner"
could becreated. The StabilisationCommissioner
would have the right of direct intervention in
national budgets in the event of consistent
breaches of theFiscal Compact. Alternatively, the
Stabilisation Commissioner could forward its
suggestions to the Council for relevant decisions.
Some member states (e.g., UK and Czech
Republic), however, do question if the Union has
the democratic legitimacy to penalise a member
state for its budget directly. The European Par-
liament is still by far no full-blown democratic
parliament [Klaus, 2009].
In short, the present discussion is about
effective rules on budget deficits and public debt
in the euro-zone countries [Buiter, 2003, Pp.
49-58] or, in other words, a new fiscal pact and
strengthened economic policy coordination [Eu-
ropean Council, 2011]. It is all about the tight-
ening of the EU budget rules to prevent future
crises.
3. Fiscal Crisis and the Much Needed Fiscal
Responsibility Legislation in India
Although in sharp contrast to the 1930s, both
the credit crunch and the recession have had more
impact on the advanced capitalisms of the north
than on the global south during the post-2007
global slowdown [Radice, 2011, Pp. 27-31],
Indian economy has been exhibiting sluggish
growth during the world-wide turmoil [Anony-
mous, 2011, Pp. 105-143], perhaps partly because
of its dependence on foreign private capital and
partly due to its internal reasons. There was a time
when it was widely held that free trade and
unrestricted inflow of foreign private capital
would undermine late industrialisation in India
and thus protection was seriously taken into
consideration at policy levels. Earlier, foreign aid
was considered to have an important role to play
in development, but presently free trade and
foreign private capital are considered essential for
development [Ghose, 2011, Pp. 27-31; Govinda
Rao and Sen, 2011]. Being a partner of the global
trade and a host of the foreign private capital,
India could not avert the impact of world-wide
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slowdown. For example, the immediate response
of mobile global capital was rush to the safe
havens of theUSA andEurope (especially, togold
and to triple-A securities) and consequently the
direct impact upon working people in the global
south was far more severe [Radice, 2011].
However, apart from the external environment,
internal policy and regulatory matters are also
responsible for the moderation in growth, par-
ticularly for the significant slowdown in invest-
ment activity. High inflation has remained the
cause of great concern in the recent time. The
annual average of wholesale price index (WPI)
and consumer price index (CPI) have increased
from 4.7 per cent and 6.2 per cent in 2007-08 to
7.6 per cent and 10 per cent in 2012-13 (April to
January), respectively [Government of India,
2013].9 The industrial sector has been experi-
encing a slowdown under the combined impact
of high inflation and rising cost of borrowing
(caused by rising interest rates). Investment
demand and private final consumption expendi-
ture have moderated as a symptom of recession.
Besides, the newly elected Government of West
Bengal (led by Trinamool Congress Party),
instead of raising its revenue level, had been
trying to "blackmail" the Centre for a bailout by
stalling the latter’s every decision of the proposed
reforms [Govinda Rao, 2012, p. 12].10 Failing to
achieve the goal, the Party has finally withdrawn
its support to the central government on 18
September 2012. However, later (i.e., in
2012-13), the state government has been suc-
cessful to raise its own revenue level, because, as
it seems, that was the only option open to it to
combat its current severe financial crunch.
In such a situation, India’s growth has shown
sluggishness. Although it showed reasonably
high growth rates in the early years of global
economic crisis (e.g., 8.6 per cent and 9.3 per cent
in 2009-10 and 2010-11, respectively), the
growth rate fell down drastically in the recent
years, to 6.2 per cent and 5 per cent in 2011-12
and 2012-13, respectively [Government of India,
2013]. Nevertheless, it seems that the so called
emerging economies including India have shown
symptoms of greater stability / quicker recovery
than the economies in the global north [Radice,
2011]. At the same time, it is very clear from the
recent trends that, after reaching certain recovery
level at the initial phase, the Indian economy has
not further been able to get out of the stagnating
growth syndromes. India’s goods export to
Europe has already moderated. Although Europe
isno longer India’s biggest export destination, the
economy may be indirectly hit via other trading
partners.11 But, India’s fiscal deficit is thought to
be a real problem. Recently, the finance minister
of India had to announce in the parliament that
the government would undertake austerity mea-
sures to combat the situation. The Reserve Bank
of India (RBI) has expressed great concern about
India’s fiscal deficit position (for fiscal deficit
trends, see Table 1). It has remarked that slippage
in the fiscal deficit has been adding to inflationary
pressures and could potentially crowd out credit
to the private sector [RBI, 2012]. Moreover, in
India, the liabilities of the public sector banks are
"entirely guaranteed by the central government"
and "they present a huge potential fiscal risk, one
which India does not have the fiscal space to
accommodate" [Bery, 2011, Pp. 10-11].
The government is finding it difficult to get out
of the expansionary spending policy in the
recession time. Had the governments (both the
centre and the states) not enacted the FRBM Bill
in 2003 by the centre and in the subsequent years
by the states, India would have been in much
worse fiscal situation during global slowdown. At
least partly, it is the FRBM Act that saved India
from falling into much deeper crisis. As it is
evident from Table 1 that fiscal deficit of the
central government alone had crossed the 6 per
cent level in 2001-02 and the combined (both
centre and states) fiscal deficit was found to be
close to 10 per cent in the same year. The situation
started changing sharply after 2003 (the year of
FRBM enactment by the Central Government)
until the economy was hit by global economic
slowdown. So, it is the FRBM which has partly
saved India from a far greater crisis during the
world-wide recession.
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Table 1. India’s Fiscal Deficit as Percentage of GDP
Year Fiscal deficit as percentage of GDP
Centre States Combined
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2000-01 5.48 3.80 8.87
2001-02 6.00 3.80 9.36
2002-03 5.73 3.76 9.03
2003-04 4.34 4.14 8.10
2004-05 3.88 3.11 7.05
2005-06 3.96 2.33 6.38
2006-07 3.32 1.82 5.10
2007-08 2.54 1.49 3.97
2008-09 5.99 2.26 8.17
2009-10 6.48 2.94 9.38
2010-11 4.90 2.62(RE) 7.81(RE)
2011-12 5.70* 2.16(BE) 6.75(BE)
2012-13 5.20 (RE)*
2013-14 4.80 (BE)*
Source: Government of India [2012], p. 42; *Budget at a Glance 2013-14, Government of India.
Notes: RE = revised estimate; BE = budget estimate.
However, contrary to this view, Govinda Rao
and Sen [2011] argue that the improvement in the
fiscal situation until 2007-08 was not attributable
to the FRBM efforts. They argue that the central
government adopted various "creative account-
ing" procedures to keep deficits outside the
budget by issuing, for example, oil and fertiliser
bonds. They also find that the improvement in
fiscal deficit was mainly due to increase in the
receipts from thesource of incometax and to some
extent revenue from service tax. The former went
up, as they argue, mainly due to the introduction
of tax information network (TIN) and its effective
implementation. However, for a high deficit- and
debt-stricken country, achieving the final goal
seems to be more important than the means, i.e.,
theway of achieving goal (of course, the spending
on social security for the ultra poor and vulnerable
sections and the other important social sector
expenditures should not be reduced). However, if
other studies precisely suggest that such spending
is not reaching out to the targeted poor then
wastage of precious public resources needs to be
immediately prevented and necessary corrective
measures should be undertaken. At the same time,
off-budget borrowing (which also accumulates
debt burden) by the public sector undertakings
should be ceased with immediate effect [Dutta,
2008]. But, as observed in the past, there is not
likely to be an easy and short-cut method as far
as wiping outof suchborrowing is concerned. The
Government of Karnataka has made several
attempts to eliminate off-budget borrowing pri-
marily by bringing these on the budget and
making provisions for the same in the budget for
2008-09 and proposing to avoid all future off-
budget borrowing in its Medium Term Fiscal
Plan.12 Earlier, while it has not been possible to
stop off-budget borrowing immediately, the
Government has made certain decisions: (1) not
to allow the list of beneficiaries of off-budget
borrowing to expand; (2) to gradually reduce
reliance on off-budget borrowing; (3) to stop
off-budget borrowing after 2004-05; among
others [Khuntia, 2003, Pp. 212-232]. However,
another way to reduce such borrowing is to resort
to privatisation of the weak or loss-making public
sector undertakings. A relatively soft measure is
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to replace the public management system of the
undertaking by efficient private management
system with a view to generating profit. In this
regard, it is not easy to deal with off-budget
borrowing which is associated with the electricity
sector in the states. Strong political decision has
to be made to fruitfully sort-out this matter. We
would briefly touch upon the economic aspects
of the electricity sector later in this article. Let us
now focus on a brief background of the fact as to
why FRBM was necessary for India.
As far as fiscal management is concerned,
India had emphasised the management of price
stability and balance of payments and thus could
maintain a smooth journey during the first 30
years after independence. The balance between
revenue (current) expenditure and revenue (cur-
rent) receipt used to be maintained by the gov-
ernments. Due to this balance, the governments
were not under pressure to finance their revenue
expenditures through borrowing. Thus, govern-
ments used to borrow resources to finance capital
expenditures only. The combined deficit of the
centre and the states was seldom seen to go
beyond 4 per cent of GDP. The debt/GDP ratio
of the country had gone up but remained below
45 per cent of GDP. Things started deteriorating
in the 1980s as growth of government expendi-
tures surpassed revenue growth [for further
details, see Bagchi, 2006]. As a consequence of
growing deficits, the debt/GDP ratio went up. In
1990-91, the combined fiscal deficit of the centre
and the states went above 9 per cent of GDP and
the debt/GDP ratio reached nearly 62 per cent
level. Consequently, interest payment as per-
centage of GDP shot up from the earlier level of
2 per cent to 4 per cent. However, debt/GDP ratio
continued to rise and reached 65 per cent level in
1999-00 [Rangarajan, 2004]. Once it even
reached the level of 81 per cent and became a
matter of concern and worry [Bagchi, 2005].
According to a study carried out by Hausmann
and Purfield [2004], in terms of debt-to-revenue
ratio India appears to be the second most indebted
country in the world (after Pakistan). Initially,
fiscal situation of the states did not raise any
concern as the deficits in the state budgets
remained at reasonable levels. However, from the
second half of the 1990s, the level of deficits in
the state budgets also started ringing alarm. The
focus then shifted to the states [Bagchi, 2006].
Govinda Rao and Sen [2011] argue that
"[e]nsuring a stable macroeconomic environment
in a multilevel fiscal system requires coordination
in stabilisation policies." In such circumstances,
the Government of India [2000: paragraph 1.85]
has observed the following:
"More effective management of public finances
continues to be the central challenge facing all
levels of government of India.... The adverse
effects of large fiscal and revenue deficits on
virtually every important dimension of macro-
economic performance are well known.... Fur-
thermore, the continuous series of large deficits
lead to inexorably mounting interest payments,
leaving a declining share of government expen-
diture available for essential functions such as
defence, law and order, social services and public
investment in infrastructure".
Rangarajan [2004] argued that fiscal sustain-
ability should ensure that a rise in fiscal deficit is
matched by a rise in the capacity to service the
increased debt. Considering this, he argued,
borrowing for infrastructure or permanent assets
may be justified. He found that a little less than
70 per cent of borrowing was not being spent on
capital assets (at least of the physical kind) - and
even when there was capital expenditure, the
return on assets was negligible.
There are several ways to maintain fiscal
balance using the provisions available within the
fiscal domain -- one, by increasing revenue; two,
by reducing expenditures; and three, by both
measures together. According to Bagchi [2006],
an easy (and also quick) measure is to adopt an
expenditure cut policy. "The axe fell mainly on
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capital expenditure and also on expenditure on
social and economic services with consequences
that unfolded later and are still unfolding" (p.
4118). Reduced capital expenditure is considered
to be adversely impacting on backward rural
regions which have been acutely suffering from
inadequate infrastructure. As the situation
reached very critical stage, the need for adopting
fiscal responsibility legislation (FRL) through the
intervention of the Finance Commission became
inevitable.
Table 2. Aggregate Receipts of State Governments
(amount in Rs. billion)
1990-1998 1998-2004 2004-08 2008-10 2010-11 2011-12(RE) 2012-13(BE)
(average) (average) (average) (average)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Aggregate receipt (1+2) 1515.20 3666.20 6496.60 9494.60 11735.70 14259.40 16333.00
(15.00) (15.90) (16.10) (15.70) (15.30) (16.10) (16.10)
1. Revenue receipt (a+b) 1143.50 2400.80 4872.10 7314.00 9353.50 11414.70 13309.80
(11.30) (10.50) (11.90) (12.10) (12.20) (12.90) (13.10)
a. States’ own revenue (i+ii) 696.20 1501.20 2921.10 4279.20 5523.60 6578.50 7649.70
(6.80) (6.50) (7.20) (7.10) (7.20) (7.40) (7.50)
i. States’ own tax 518.00 1187.80 2333.60 3425.00 4607.10 5514.70 6450.70
(5.10) (5.20) (5.70) (5.70) (6.00) (6.20) (6.30)
ii. States’ own non-tax 178.20 313.40 587.50 854.20 916.50 1063.90 1199.00
(1.70) (1.40) (1.40) (1.40) (1.20) (1.20) (1.20)
b. Current transfer (i+ii) 447.30 899.60 1951.00 3034.84 3829.90 4836.10 5660.10
(4.50) (3.90) (4.70) (5.00) (5.00) (5.50) (5.60)
i. Shareable taxes 254.30 517.00 1110.70 1630.30 2194.90 2597.30 3021.90
(2.50) (2.30) (2.70) (2.70) (2.90) (2.90) (3.00)
ii. Grants-in-aid 193.00 382.60 840.40 1404.50 1635.00 2238.90 2638.20
(2.00) (1.70) (2.00) (2.30) (2.10) (2.50) (2.60)
2. Capital receipts (a+b) 371.80 1265.40 1624.50 2180.70 2382.30 2844.70 3023.33
(3.70) (5.40) (4.20) (3.60) (3.10) (3.20) (3.00)
a. Loans from Centre 180.80 260.90 117.40 75.60 94.80 159.90 202.10
(1.80) (1.20) (0.30) (0.10) (0.10) (0.20) (0.20)
b. Other capital receipts 191.00 1004.50 1507.10 2105.10 2287.50 2684.90 2821.10
(1.90) (4.20) (3.90) (3.50) (3.00) (3.00) (2.80)
Source: RBI (2013), p. 29.
Note: 1. The period averages provided in this table reflect the different fiscal phases of the states;
2. Figures in parentheses are percentages to GDP;
3. Capital receipts include public accounts on a net basis;
4. RE = Revised estimate; BE = Budget estimate.
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There is another part, i.e., revenue receipt.
During the FRBM regime, how much of the fiscal
correction in Indian states has occurred due to the
states’ own revenue mobilisations? Or, does the
credit go to devolutions from the centre only?
Fiscal improvement at the state level is attribut-
able to both the central transfers (CT) and states’
own tax revenue (OTR). Let us take a look at
Table 2 which presents phase-wise data (averages
for some phases) on aggregate receipts of the state
governments. In the first phase of fiscal consoli-
dation -- i.e., during 2004-08 -- it is not only the
CT/GDP ratio that has increased (from 3.9 per
cent to 4.7 per cent) against the previous phase of
1998-2004, but OTR/GDP ratio has also
increased (from 5.2 per cent to 5.7 per cent) and
thus contributed to the consolidation process in
the fiscal domain. In the early recession period,
(i.e., during 2008-10), the OTR/GDP ratio
remained stagnant at 5.7 per cent. But, it has
shown increasing trend thereafter (6 per cent in
2010-11, 6.2 per cent in 2011-12 RE, and 6.3 per
cent in 2012-13 BE). If the special category states
are excluded from these estimations, states’
OTR/GDP ratio may perhaps demonstrate greater
improvement. The reason is as follows. The
typical features of a special category state include
hilly terrain, sparsely populated habitation, and
high transport costs which lead to high cost of
delivering public services. With relatively low
level of economic activity in most special cate-
gory states, their tax base is limited compared to
non-special category states. "These States, to a
large extent, depend on transfers from the Centre
(comprising grants and tax devolutions) for their
resource needs" [RBI, 2011: 37].
Loss incurred by the state electric utilities is
another major concern as far as improvement in
states’ fiscal condition is concerned. Electricity
is provided to farmers free of charge in some
states. In the domestic or residential sector too,
electricity is provided at subsidised rates which
vary according to different categories of con-
sumers. It has been observed that tariffs are
typically higher for those households that
consume more electricity [IISD, 2012]. But, such
higher tariffs do not fully offset the costs incurred
for distribution of power free of charge or at
subsidised rates. So, the governments provide
subsidy to the distribution utilities. The actual
subsidy that is transferred to the utilities is termed
as "subsidy released" and is often lower than the
amount of "subsidy booked (the state govern-
ments announce this amount beforehand, which
is to be disbursed to the utilities as
compensation)". According to Government of
India [2011], the accumulated losses of the dis-
tribution utilities during 2005-10 account for Rs.
820 billion after subsidy has been paid. Part of
this loss that is supported by the government
guarantees is not reflected in the total public
debt/GDP ratio since such guarantees belong to
the off-budget accounts. However, they have the
potential of becoming budgetary liabilities, in
case a company is in deep financial trouble. (For
a rough idea, let us make a simple calculation. At
the end of March 2010, the states’ total out-
standing liabilities accounted for Rs. 16,486.50
billion. As a proportion of the national GDP of
2009-10, it accounted for 25.45 per cent. If we
include the above-mentioned loss amount, i.e.,
Rs. 820 billion, in the states’ total outstanding
liabilities, the proportion goes up to 26.72 per
cent.) Around 70 per cent of the financial losses
of distribution companies during 2005-10 have
been financed through loans from public sector
banks. Of the total bank loans outstanding at Rs.
585 billion, as much as 42 per cent is backed by
government guarantees. Srivastava et al. [2003]
argue that subsidies that arise due to such guar-
antees extended by governments for loans taken
by the public enterprises or distribution utilities
are regarded as off-budget subsidies. They point
out that these have the potential of becoming
budgetary liabilities if there are defaults in loans
guaranteed by the government. Keeping this in
view, the RBI[2013:1] has cautioned that "[t]here
is ... a need to improve the measurement and
reporting of implicit obligations of the states to
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reflect their true fiscal positions, particularly in
light of increasing off-budget liabilities on
account of guarantees to state power distribution
companies (discoms)." If this is not kept in view
then the states can show themselves to be on the
right track in terms of the FRBM, while they are
actually not.
4. Market Forces and Fiscal Stability: A
Two-way Relationship
The overall goal of the reformed SGP13 is to
impose discipline on member states with poten-
tially massive budget problems. Structural
reforms especially to increase the
competitiveness of the deficit countries in the
Union are necessary. Stability in a fiscal union
cannot be established just on the basis of volun-
tary principles.
To receive greater degree of fiscally respon-
sible behaviour, another approach, next to better
regulation, would be to encourage market forces.
Weak market may jeopardise government’s
efforts of maintaining fiscal discipline. For
example, low level of economic transactions in a
weak country would not be able to generate
desired level of revenues to be contributed to
public exchequer. Similar examples can be drawn
from other specific markets, such as high interest
rate in financial/money market. Institutional
obstacles, if found responsible for sluggish
growth of an economy, need to be removed. Thus,
both approaches -- fiscal disciplines and market
forces -- can reinforce each other and be applied
simultaneously. If member states know that no
bailout is possible, they will show greater will-
ingness to follow the fiscal rules. Articles 122 to
125 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty,
2008, highlight the judicial basis for disciplining
market forces [Hentschelmann, 2010:40]. Article
125, the famous bailout Article, states that no
member state, or the Union, is responsible for
what might result into fiscally unsustainable
commitments made by some other member sta-
te/s. According to Article 125:
The Union shall not be liable for or assume the
commitments of central governments, regional,
local or other public authorities, other bodies
governed by public law, or public undertakings
of any Member State, without prejudice to mutual
financial guarantees for the joint execution of a
specific project. A Member State shall not be
liable for or assume the commitments of central
governments, regional, local or other public
authorities, other bodies governed by public law,
or public undertakings of another Member State,
without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees
for the joint execution of a specific project.
Let us now explain the relevance of this
Article. The large deficit countries may face
higher interest rate on the bonds they have issued
to finance the government debt. If the financial
marketsassume,however, as they did till recently,
that in the end the Union will pay the debts, the
creditworthiness will be misjudged and interest
rates will be lower than what it should actually
be. The present sovereign debt crisis can also be
diagnosed as a situation that since one mecha-
nism, i.e., the fiscal compact, has failed to
maintain its disciplined management/behaviour,
the other mechanism in the form of market forces
has taken over to the extreme. Govinda Rao and
Sen [2011] argue that "[a]n important precondi-
tion for market promoting federalism is the hard
budget constraint because fiscally responsible
decision can come only under such an environ-
ment and therefore the policies should be cali-
brated to avoid bailouts and free-riding
behaviour." Further, according to them: It is not
uncommon that the countries/states which have
more developed markets and have been able to
create greater market friendly environment will
attract capital and skilled labour and grow faster
than others. This requires creation of market-
friendly policy environment and institutions.
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India has adopted liberalising policies on various
frontssince 1991. In the lastdecade, India realised
that both central and state governments have to
respond to the globalising environment from the
fiscal perspectives as well. Exorbitant govern-
mentdeficit would result in low demand for goods
and services since people would save more than
before in order to be prepared for the future hike
in tax rate (the government would raise the tax
rate in the future to finance the present defi-
cit/debt).
As regards strengthening of market forces, one
of the possible prescribed solutions, as discussed
in many quarters, for the sovereign debt crisis is
the creation of so-called Eurobonds [Springford,
2009]. If Eurobonds are issued they will be issued
as a combined mechanism and will not be issued
separately by the individual member states. Thus,
the interest rate will probably become an average
of the interest rates that the several member states
will have to pay. As a result, the countries with a
low government debt would see that the rate of
interest they were earlier charged rises now, while
the countries with a high debt would experience
the opposite phenomenon. The financial market,
however, as is probably the intention of issuing
Eurobonds, can no longer effectively, in the
extreme, take an individual state as hostage, for
example, by asking an exceptionally high interest
rate on bonds of the troubled member state.
Greece would be facing such tough situation if it
needed to finance the present deficit with its own
bonds. Conversely, Germany has not approved
the idea of floating common Eurobonds since it
has to pay higher interest rate. However, some
may argue that such an arrangement after Ger-
many has said "yes" might weaken the market
discipline.14 Although such a cosmetic solution
can be worked out for temporary relief, the EU
has to eventually think of radical remedy to
gradually get out of its structural problems of
deficits and debts. Thus, imposition of somekinds
of strict rules assumes special importance.
5. Fiscal Management: Incentivised Legis-
lation in India vis-à-vis Strict Rules in the EU
The TFC, in its recommendations, linked
improvement in revenuedeficit status of the states
to the debt write-off. Thus, the Finance Com-
mission introduced the incentivisation scheme
into the fiscal consolidation process in order to
woo the state governments in maintaining fiscal
discipline and consequently macroeconomic
stabilisation [Herd and Leibfritz, 2008]. The
recommendation was like this: The states will be
awarded debt write-off, only if they enact
appropriate legislations to bring down the reve-
nue deficit in the specified period of time and
commit to reducing the fiscal deficit in a phased
manner. So, there has been an attempt in India to
ensure fiscal discipline by introducing incentive
and legislation. Most of the states were keen to
grab the incentives as they were heavily indebted.
But, for grabbing the incentives, they had to go
in for the legislation. Once the legislation was
done, the states were put into constitutional
binding to follow the FRBM rules. Similarly, the
present EU treaty called as Fiscal Compact does
also contain obligatory provision of legislative
enactment. Let us now present some observations
as well as suggestions in view of the proper/ef-
fective implementation of the new Fiscal Com-
pact.
- A weak point of the previous fiscal pact was
that the sanctions were, in fact, only theoretical.
Their implication was low from the implemen-
tation point of view. Fines should have been
imposed on the offending member states. In the
new Fiscal Compact, however, sanctions are no
longer theoretical but real and automatic. The EC
can directly impose the sanctions without referral
from the Council (see Article 126 TFEU), which
was earlier subject to qualified majority voting in
the Council. There are even ideas in the EC to
completely suspend the voting rights of countries
in the case of the breach of the agreement.
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-Since the rules of the previous SGP have been
consistently violated, in the preventive as well as
the dissuasive arms, there must be strong provi-
sion of taking action on the EC and any individual
member state as the case may be. The case/s must
be taken before the European Court of Justice
(ECJ). At present, this provision is not explicitly
included in the Treaties. This provision was made
in an earlier draft but has been, though not
completely yet, deleted in the final versions.
Currently, if a state, which has ratified the Fiscal
Compact and is thereby bound by the fiscal
provisions of the Compact, fails to enact the
required "implementation law" in its own par-
liament within one year of the treaty’s entry into
force, it can ultimately be fined up to 0.1 per cent
of its GDP by the ECJ. This fine will have to be
transferred directly to the ESM. As has been
indicated earlier, access to the ESM bailout pro-
vision would be conditional on signing the new
treaty of fiscal disciplines. Thus, member states
cannotbe bailed-outunless they do sign and apply
the pact. A legislation related to implementation
of balanced budget should be included in the
national constitutions of the member states when
there is no major exceptional shock (we discuss
this later again). In addition, if failed in main-
taining balanced budget, a member state should
be taken to ECJ. Due to the present financial
turmoil and the consequent political tension,
many people are highly apprehensive about the
future existence of the EU. However, a chance
has now opened up before the EU to find new
routes of establishing fiscal discipline through the
fiscal treaty and building solidarity through the
ESM.
- A post of European Stabilisation Commis-
sioner needs to be created to monitor the national
budgets. If a country does not comply with its
commitments under the Fiscal Compact, the so-
called European Structural and Cohesion Funds
could be denied to the member state.
- If a member state has accepted or needs
support from the funds of the ESM, the budgetary
sovereignty of the member state gets automati-
cally restricted. This is because then a national
government has to present its draft budget in the
EU (or EC) for approval before it presents the
same in its own parliament. And the EU, if
necessary, can temporarily reject or refuse it,
suggesting some specific spending cuts or the
establishments of new revenue streams or the
both. In this endeavour, both the ESM and the
Stabilization Commissioner can play the neces-
sary roles.
- Chronic deficits (and debt) of a certain
country may adversely affect banks located in
other countries. This is because of the fact that
those banks have purchased bonds of the
defaulting countries. To save those banks, some
arrangements should be made, otherwise tax-
payers’ burden in those countries will unneces-
sarily increase.
- Good rules should be simple and easily
verifiable. For Buiter [2003: 4], the earlier SGP
rules were "both simple and simply wrong much
of the time. It is better to be approximately right
than precisely wrong". Some people are strongly
arguing to eradicate structural deficit problem,15
whereas a rule in the new Compact asserts that
the budget deficit is normally not to exceed the
0.5 per cent of GDP, which could be further
cyclically adjusted. This means that flexibility in
the form of cyclical adjustment has been allowed
in the Compact. The EU believed that splitting
budget deficits into their cyclical and structural
components -- althoughanalyticalprocess of such
splitting is critical -- determines how much of the
deficit is cyclical and will be slowly tackled when
the economy recovers and how much is structural
and must be eliminated by discretionary fiscal
measures such as tax increases and spending cuts
[McArdle, 2012]. To calculate the cyclical com-
ponent, one would need (a) current and historic
growth rates, (b) potential growth rates, and (c)
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output gaps expressed in terms of difference
between these two growth rates, that is (b) - (a).
Then, estimating the impact of the output gap (the
extent to which the economy is under- or over-
heating) on the budget through a regression, one
would get the cyclical component of the deficit.
Finally, the structural component is the residual
when temporary or one-off factors (expenditures
and revenues) are excluded from the cyclical
component. This mathematically/statistically
derived cyclical adjustment notion has some
shortfall due to non-incorporation of a subjective
variable such as political factor and thus may lead
to structural deficit crisis if the process of budget,
sometimes politically inflated, is not properly
monitored. This might happen due to populist
political agenda (greater spending programmes)
of the ruling party/coalition, which may be seen
to have outweighed the need for maintaining
fiscal disciplines. However, it is imperative to
allow for cyclical adjustment to tackle unfa-
vourable circumstances. The current treaty states
that the countries may temporarily incur deficits
only to take into account the budgetary impact of
the economic cycle and exceptional economic
circumstances such as unusual event (which has
a major impact on the financial position) beyond
the control of the contracting party or severe
economic downturn, provided that this does not
endanger budgetary sustainability in medium
term. More specifically, in the treaty, the
medium-term budgetary objectives (MTOs)
allow the structural budget balances to be
country-specific, taking into account differences
across countries according to their economic
fundamentals and risks to public-finance sus-
tainability. Thus, the member states were
requested to declare their specific MTOs in view
of the following considerations:
* a balanced or surplus structural budgetary
position (for high debt/low potential growth
countries);
* a general limit of a structural deficit of 0.5
per cent of GDP, while the limit can be
increased to up to 1 per cent only for
countries with a government debt-to-GDP
ratio significantly below 60 per cent and
with low risks to long-term fiscal sustain-
ability;
* the above-mentioned tight limits have been
designed so that the member states can try
to maintain the earlier budget deficit limit
of 3 per cent in times of economic downturn
(if the deficit is already very close to 3 per
cent level, it would shoot up to much higher
level during recession).
Hence, there are flexibilities in the Fiscal
Compact to make necessary adjustments taking
into account different situations.
6. Twelfth Finance Commission and the
FRBM in India
It is imperative that in order to keep the fiscal
issues of the member states on the right track the
EU might need to think of a mechanism of
surveillance that would include, among others,
formulation of a set of rules, creation of a
responsible post, etc. India has already initiated
its own mechanism. Considering the alarming
fiscal situation (especially the deficit and debt
levels) in India, the TFC had recommended a set
of fiscal rules (for both the centre and the states).
As indicated earlier, it also recommended inc-
entives (to be offered by the centre) for the states
which would enact the rules in the state
assemblies. Let us now discuss this in a little
detail.
Finance Commission is a constitutional body
formed after every five years "to undertake a
quinquennial review of the resources of the Union
and the States, ... and make recommendations on
the manner in which the proceeds of Union taxes
and duties have to be shared between the Central
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Government and the States, and further on the
manner in which the share of the states is to be
distributed among all the states" [Ramji et al.,
2001: 28]. The Eleventh Finance Commission
[2000-2005] had recommended the centre and the
states to restore fiscalbalance andasked thecentre
tocreate an incentive fund for thestates thatwould
follow the fiscal restructuring plan. However, the
plan did not materialize. The focus of the TFC’s
[2005-2010] report was on fiscal consolidation
and enactment of the FRBM Rules. The centre
had already enacted the FRBM rules [in 2003]
before the TFC came up with its report [in 2004],
hence, enhanced emphasis was given in relation
to the states in its report. Some of the recom-
mendations are as follows [Government of India,
2004]:
* Revenue deficit to be eliminated.
* Fiscal deficit to be brought down to 3 per cent
of GDP (for states, 3 per cent of gross state
domestic product) and, at a maximum, to be
contained at this level.
* The combined (centre and states) debt-GDP
ratio with external debt measured at historical
exchange rates should, at a minimum, be
initially brought down to 75 per cent (at the
time of recommendation it was 81 per cent).
* The long term goal for the centre and the states
for the debt-GDP ratio should be 28 per cent
each.
* The centre’s interest payment relative to
revenue receipts should be about 28 per cent.
In the case of the states, the level of interest
payments relative to revenue receipts should
be 15 per cent.
* States should follow a policy of recruitment
andwage, in a manner such that the total salary
bill relative to revenue (recurring) expendi-
ture net of interest payments and pensions
does not exceed 35 per cent.
Rangarajan and Srivastava [2008] observed
that, after the enactment of FRBM, the fiscal
situation in terms of both fiscal deficit and
debt/GDP ratio for both the centre and the states
has improved. This improvement continued until
the economy was hit by the world-wide recession.
However, it was evident that India’s strong fed-
eral system, with the centre occupying greater
financial power, has facilitated by and large
smooth enactment and implementation of fiscal
responsibility legislations. Let us now briefly
discuss this issue in the following section.
7. Has Indian Constitution’s Centripetal Bias
Played Any Role?
Under the British regime, an Act was passed
in 1919 which specified that the provinces should
make initial contributions to the Federal Gov-
ernment to cover its deficits for a period of seven
years and thereafter make a standard annual
contribution. However, the 1935 Act commanded
a financially strong Centre, and for Federal
Grants-in-aid, conditional or discretionary, to be
given to the provinces to meet public purposes.
India became independent in 1947. The economic
and social conditions prevalent in the wake of the
Second World War and the Partition of the
country appeared to provide logical support to the
emergence of a strong Centre, with the Indian
Constitution of 1950, not conferring more powers
on the states than was considered under the 1935
Act [Ramji, et al. 2001]. Leftists in India are in
favour of transferring more powers to the states.
The Left Front has ruled the state of West Bengal
for last 34 years (until it was out of power in 2011
assembly election) and largely accused the centre
for occupying greater financial power and fos-
tering a condition of underdevelopment in dif-
ferent states.
West Bengal and Sikkim are only two states
which had earlier declined to enact the FRBM.
West Bengal did not want to lose its borrowing
power at greater scale and opposed the centre’s
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policies of fiscal restructuring from different
perspectives. Some arguments that wereprovided
by the earlier Left Front-ruled Government are as
follows [Government of India, 2010]:
* While, on the one hand, in the Constitution
the major responsibilities in the sphere of
development expenditure (for example, on
irrigation, roads, power, education, health,
etc.) and administrative expenditure (for
example, on law and order, general adminis-
tration, etc.) have been given to the states, the
important revenue-raising powers (such as
income tax, corporate tax, union excise duties,
customs, service tax, etc.) have remained
concentrated in the hands of the centre, on the
other.
* While the states are endowed with less power
of resource mobilisation and greater respon-
sibility of development expenditure, the gap
is not adequately met through fund transfers
from the centre to the states in terms of
devolution of central taxes and grants.
* It may also be noted that the share of total
market borrowing to which the states may be
entitled is also fixed by the centre. While in
1950s the share of market borrowing of the
states and the centre in the total government
market borrowings were approximately in the
proportion of 50:50, this share of market
borrowing of the states has now fallen sharply
to about 20 per cent, with more than 80 per
cent of the market borrowing being garnered
by the centre.
In addition, as some allege, the central gov-
ernment takes the opportunity of raising funds by
imposing surcharge rather than altering the rates
and thus they can avoid sharing the receipts with
the states [Amiya K Bagchi, 2004]. Even though
all these are considered as counterarguments, it
becomes once again evident that Indian Consti-
tution has a centripetal bias, which has facilitated
the FRBM to come into effect. And it has further
been evident that the FRBM has helped the centre
and thestates to bring the fiscal condition in order.
Adoption of incentivisation policy was instru-
mental. Finally, West Bengal had to bow down
and enact the FRBM (little before the Left Front
lost power), since such enactment was linked to
some incentive schemes awarded by the centre.
Incentives facilitated legislation and legislation
facilitated fiscal restructuring process. This has
been partly, if not largely, possible for the centre’s
possession of greater financial power, something
which is missing in the EU federal structure.
Let us conclude this section by referring to
another important issue relevant as an appendage.
The Planning Commission is responsible for
earmarking the plan size for each state for a
Five-Year plan period. Indian state-level politi-
cians, especially the chief ministers and finance
ministers, often raise their voice for greater plan
size. Approval of a large plan size provides a chief
minister with arguments in favour of her/his
successful efforts for further development of the
state. The ruling party takes the opportunity to
publicize the approval of a large plan size and
wants to earn political competitiveness. Such
approval from the Planning Commission was
possible in case the same political party was in
power both at centre and at a particular state
[Biswas, et al. 2008].
Let us now try to understand about how an
approved plan is financed. The expenditure on
state plans consists of (1) the balance from current
revenues from the state budgets, (2) plan assis-
tance in the form of grants and loans by the central
government (the grant-loan ratio is fixed at
30:70),16 and (3) borrowing from other sources
that include the market and different small saving
schemes [Government of India, 2004]. Here, the
important point to note is that if the balance from
current revenues (i.e., money from the first
source) appears to be negative, something which
the states have experienced for a long period of
time before the FRBM regime, "the financing of
the plan, apart from a small contribution of the
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plan grants from the centre, depends entirely on
borrowing by the states" [Government of India,
2004: 20]. Although the main observation is
important, part of the explanation seems to be
flawed. According to the Thirteenth Finance
Commission report, plan grants were 35.80 per
cent of the total transfers from the centre to the
states during the award period of the Eighth
Finance Commission [1984-89]. The share has
come down to 28.55 per cent during the Twelfth
Finance Commission award period [2005-10].
Although the share has decreased over time, the
latest proportion/figure cannot be considered as a
"small contribution" (as it has been termed by the
Government of India, 2004) compared to the total
size of the state plan. However, larger plan size
has led the states to greater debt trap. How? The
states often considered a larger plan size as a
positive reflection on their economic perform-
ances [Government of India, 2002: 3]. The states
which wanted to increase the ‘grant’ part, it had
to necessarily increase the ‘loan’ part as well in
order to maintain the grant-loan ratio to be 30:70.
Thismeans that a larger plan size effectively leads
to larger borrowing. This has provoked the TFC
to suggest the plan size of every state be linked
to the sustainable level of debt. A relatively large
plan size is affordable with the less borrowing
pressure if revenue surplus goes up. Such linkage
needs to be incorporated in the EU fiscal con-
solidation processes.
8. Some Views, Not Just Conclusion or Sum-
mary
Does a rule-based system work in controlling
and/or reducing deficit and debt? For the Indian
states, the favourable effects of FRBM on deficit
reduction were observed until the process was
interrupted by the global slowdown [Dutta,
2012a]. FRBM has temporarily been relaxed to
combat effects of the slowdown. There are signs
that the states will be able to reduce deficits within
dates newly fixed by the Kelkar Panel, if not by
the earlier ones fixed by the Thirteenth Finance
Commission (for the latest state-wise trends of
revenue deficit and fiscal deficit, see Dutta
[2012b]). But, turmoil is going on in the EU,
especially in countries like Greece, Portugal,
Ireland and Spain. Unlike the EU member states,
a state government in India is not a sovereign
body; rather it is partly but significantly depen-
dent on the central government for resources,
since the central government has adequate tax
collecting powers. Thus, it has been possible for
the central government to make the states enact
the FRBM through introducing incentives, e.g.,
debt write-off scheme, swap of the high cost debt,
etc. The EU federal system is very different from
that of India. Attempts to bring in changes in the
two systems may hint at a trade-off between
decentralisation and the requirements of the fiscal
union. Can the Indian states prefer greater
autonomy at the cost of strong federal system?
Can the EU member states prefer stronger federal
bond at the cost of their sovereignty or autonomy?
May be, extreme surrenders are not feasible or
desirable from the perspectives of the concerned
stakeholders, but some amount of compromise
may result in more favourable outcomes. For
example, the Indian centripetal bias may get
somewhat loosened and thus a more decentralised
fiscal union is produced (through, among others,
transfer of some tax collecting powers from the
centre to the states). Conversely, the EU member
states may compromise their moderate fiscal
sovereignty in the interest of stronger federal-
fiscal Union.
Currently, if a state, which has ratified the
Fiscal Compact and is thereby bound by the fiscal
provisions of the Compact, fails to enact the
required "implementation law" in its own par-
liament within one year of the treaty’s entry into
force, it can ultimately be fined up to 0.1 per cent
of its GDP by the ECJ. Questions have already
been raised as to whether a sovereign member
statecan bepunished by the EC. Amidst this, there
is a proposal from the EC to introduce the "Eu-
ropean Union financial transaction tax" (EUFTT)
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within some of the member states of the
EHYPERLINK "http://en.wikipedia.org/wi-
ki/European_Union" EU by 1 January 2014.17
Somewhat greater financial power of the EC
might create a relatively strong central body in
the EU which might be useful in generating
stronger federal system in the region.
India’s FRBM is a legislation which has been
enacted in national parliament and state
assemblies, whereas EU’s Fiscal Compact is a set
of rules that have not been legislated. The EU
member states are expected to enact the imple-
mentation law of the Compact in their national
parliaments within one year after they have
ratified the Compact. Violation of SGP rules has
been observed earlier. Once the present rules are
enacted, violation of the legislation by the gov-
ernment is extremely difficult unless duly
amended. Possibility of amendment in the future,
without taking any consent from the EC, cannot
be totally overruled, since each member state is
an independent sovereign country. So, a central
mechanism at the EU level is required to be
created to discuss whenever any uncomfortable
circumstances associated with exercising the
Compact arises in any member state, in order to
prevent undesirable changes in the law. In India,
to respond to cyclical fluctuations in the economy
and exogenous shocks, temporary relaxations of
FRBM rules -- as has been experienced during the
recent recession -- may be necessary from time to
time. This is being considered by the Fourteenth
Finance Commission as one of the Terms of
Reference asks the Commission to address this
issue. However, in our opinion, states should not
be allowed much autonomy in this regard,
because that may be misused under political
pressure; rather a permanent post of FRBM
Commissioner can be created under the office of
the Central Finance Commission to recommend
state-specific relaxations from time to time, as
necessary, and such provision (i.e., FRBM
Commissioner’s role) should be included in the
FRBM Acts.
Another important issue also needs to be
touched upon in this regard. Spending cuts have
led to citizens’ agitations and demonstrations in
some troubled EU countries. In India, it is true
that although the states have benefited from the
FRBM with respect to deficit reduction, they
have, however, experienced a harsh situation as
well -- i.e., a fall in their recurring (revenue)
expenditures [Dutta, 2012b]. Similarly, as Poly-
chroniou [2012] argues, Greece has been passing
through tough time due to its harsh austerity
measures, resulting in reduction in social sector
expenditures like education, unemployment
allowances, etc. While Polychroniou blamed the
tough fiscal rules for the Greek social unrest, he
did not forget at the same time to tell us that "there
are definite specific domestic factors at work
which led to the build-up of the crisis both within
and outside the context of the financial crisis" (p.
35). Especially, when he states that "under the
long and ignominious reign of the socialists, the
looting of public wealth became an art form and
covering up corruption a science" (p. 38) then we
cannot just target the tight fiscal rules for all the
odds that have been occurring. Something should
have been done to correct the governance deficit
as well. Moreover, in the process of fiscal
restructuring, it is not always obligatory to reduce
expenditures; one can also think of imposing
taxes as well. Reducing expenditure, as some
argue, could adversely impact on the standard of
living of the poor if there is any cut in spending
on social security and other social sector such as
health and education. Creating a fiscal union to
supplement its monetary union is only one of the
EU’sproblems. Part of theproblemisalso to bring
about structural reform and adjustment in many
member states in order to improve their com-
petitive position. If the EU, as indicated above,
can create greater funds at the exchequer of the
EC through tax collecting powers and/or other
mechanisms, the member states can receive
supplementary funds from the Fiscal Compact on
the lines of India’s Finance Commission’s
devolutions, including grants, to tackle adverse
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situations when they are in trouble. This would,
however, require a degree of cohesiveness and a
sense of oneness as a nation, which may be more
missing in the EU than in India. From the per-
spective of Indian situation, Chandrasekhar
[2011, Pp. 21-37] argues that India’s tax/GDP
ratio (11.3 per cent as per 2006 accounts) is
extremely low by international standards,
including those of many developing countries. He
stated:
"In the 1950s and the 1960s, economists con-
cerned with development had concluded that
national savings and government revenues in
most developing countries were as low as they
were not because these countries were poor, but
because their governments had failed to ade-
quately tax the rich in their countries. This meant
that tax revenues of the government were lower
than warranted" (p. 23).
But, when it comes to fiscal restructuring plan,
many politicians as well as policymakers talk
about austerity (the price of which is mostly borne
by the poor), not about a mixed strategy that could
offer a scope for maintaining a balance between
both austerity and new revenue generation. In
addition, fiscal restructuring also engages certain
kind of policy shift from unreasonable, huge,
recurrent (revenue) expenditure (that often
engenders wastage through unproductive as well
as unnecessary administrative expenses) to spe-
cific number of infrastructure projects through
capital outlay.18 The difference between the two
is that the former has a much smaller multiplier
effect in generating further income and revenue
compared to the latter which is expected to induce
new economic activities and thus new avenues for
earning revenues. This is what had happened in
the USA while the government had been tackling
the Great Depression in the 1930s. Beyond the
common notion of demand-generating, expan-
sionary, expenditure policy, the US government
sought to resort to structural shift from petty local
expenditures to large federal projects:
"Before 1932 relative shares for each level were
roughly 50% local, 20% state, and 30% federal
government. After 1940, 30% of relative shares
were local, 24% state, and 46% federal. A major
part of increasing government expenditures,
75%, came in programs administered at the
federal level but in cooperation with state and
local governments" [Bordo et al. 2011: 9].
This clearly indicates a shift of focus from
small projects to large projects. Large-scale
expenditure in big infrastructure projects not only
provided employment and thus helped generate
demand through increased purchasing power, but
also encouraged new entrepreneurship by linking
remote areas with markets and growth centres,
something which was also crucially important to
get rid of recession first and prosper further.
NOTES
1. For an analysis from a legal point of view of the first
draft of a new EU fiscal pact, see Peers [2011]; and Vascon-
celos [2012] for an analysis of the third draft.
2. See "Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions"
published by the EC on 3 October 2012, which is available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/smact/docs/single-mark
et-act2_en.pdf.
3. To come into effect, at least 12 of the 17 euro-zone
member states have to ratify this intergovernmental fiscal
treaty.
4. Violation of an Act is not permitted without necessary
amendment in the national parliament or in a state assembly
in question.
5. In the first quarter of 2012, the overall government
deficit of the euro-zone countries was 3.2 per cent of GDP.
The primary budget deficit of the euro-zone member states,
net lending or borrowing excluding interest, as a percentage
of GDP was about zero. Government debt as a percentage of
GDP was on an average 87.3 per cent. The unemployment
rate was about 11 per cent and consumer-price inflation was
2.6 percent. In the first quarter of 2012, there was no growth
in the euro-zone. It is to be noted that, for all these fig-
ures/parameters, the differences between the individual
member states vary significantly. For example, the
government deficit for Finland is 0.7 per cent, whereas for
Ireland 8.3 per cent.
6. The European Council defines the general political
direction and priorities of the Union. The Council consists of
the heads of governments of the EU member states, together
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with the President of the European Commission and the
President of the European Council.
7. The budget of the EU is too small to play any role, in
general, in stimulating the economyor, inparticular, in solving
the present sovereign debt crisis. The total budget (e.g. 147
billion euro in 2012) is about one per cent of the total GNP of
the Union and the revenue and expenditure shown in the
budget have to be in balance (Article 310, Consolidated
Versions of the Treaty, 2008).
8. For the final version, see http://www.european-counci
l.europa.eu/media/639235/st00tscg26_en12.pdf; for the
fourth draft, see http://openeuropeblog.blogspot.com/2012/0
1/draft-euro-fiscal -pact-episode-iv.html; and see http://ww
w.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/9026142/The-EU-
fiscal- draft-treaty-in-full.html for the first draft.
9. The annual averages of WPI and CPI were found to be
9.6 per cent and 10.4 per cent in 2010-11 and 8.9 per cent and
8.4 per cent in 2011-12, respectively, which appeared to be
very high as compared to the 2007-08 levels [Government of
India, 2013].
10. For many years, tax receipt of West Bengal, relative
to its gross state domestic product (GSDP), has remained the
lowest in the country. The tax-GSDP ratio in the state was 4.5
per cent in 2011-12, compared to the all-state average of 5.7
per cent [Govinda Rao, 2012]. The earlier Left Front gov-
ernment was largely responsible for such a situation and the
present Trinamool Congress government does not also seem
to have adopted corrective mode. The state’s debt-burden is
huge and so is their burden of annual interest payment.
11. The Times of India, 11 June, 2012.
12. See (1) Business Line, The Hindu, 19 July 2003,
Saturday, http://www.thehindubusinessline.in/2003/07/19/st
ories/2003071901291700.htm; and (2) The Hindu, 23 July
2008, Wednesday, http://www.hindu.com/2008/07/23/storie
s/2008072354240400.htm.
13. Recently, the EC has produced four drafts. For the first
draft, see Peers (2011); for the second draft, see http://www.
openeurope.org.uk/research/06012012draftfiscalpact.pdf;
for the third, see Vasconselos (2012); and see http://www.e
uropolitics.info/penalties-for-botching-debt-brake-fifth-draf
t-possible-art323899-32.html, for the fourth draft.
14. Germany has to understand that if the present turmoil
keeps growing in the EU then the size of its export in EU
countries may go down.
15. In general term, a structural deficit differs from a
cyclical deficit in that it exists irrespective of the point in the
business cycle due to an underlying imbalance in government
revenues and expenditures. Thus, even at a relatively high
point in the businesscycle (whenrevenue level shouldbe high)
the country may still be in deficit and thereby resort to
borrowing. We would now conceptually see how its techni-
calities are supposed to be dealt with in the European Fiscal
Compact.
16. For the special category states (which are located in
hilly terrain and have relatively very low level of economic
activity as well as limited tax base), the ratio is 90:10.
17. For further details, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
European_Union_financial_transaction_tax.
18. "Liberal policies did not and do not stipulate retreat of
the state from its basic duties of building up social and
economic infrastructure" [Chelliah, 2010, p. 12].
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